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A new class of codes for Boolean masking of
cryptographic computations
Claude Carlet Philippe Gaborit Jon-Lark Kim Patrick Sole´
Abstract
We introduce a new class of rate one-half binary codes: complementary information set codes.
A binary linear code of length 2n and dimension n is called a complementary information set code
(CIS code for short) if it has two disjoint information sets. This class of codes contains self-dual
codes as a subclass. It is connected to graph correlation immune Boolean functions of use in the
security of hardware implementations of cryptographic primitives. Such codes permit to improve the
cost of masking cryptographic algorithms against side channel attacks. In this paper we investigate this
new class of codes: we give optimal or best known CIS codes of length < 132. We derive general
constructions based on cyclic codes and on double circulant codes. We derive a Varshamov-Gilbert
bound for long CIS codes, and show that they can all be classified in small lengths ≤ 12 by the
building up construction. Some nonlinear permutations are constructed by using Z4-codes, based on
the notion of dual distance of an unrestricted code.
Keywords: cyclic codes, self-dual codes, dual distance, double circulant codes, Z4-codes
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the seminal work of P. Kocher [18], [19], it is known that the physical implementation of
cryptosystems on devices such as smart cards leaks information which can be used in differential
power analysis or in other kinds of side channel attacks. These attacks can be devastating if
proper counter-measures are not included in the implementation. A kind of counter-measure,
which is suitable for both hardware and software cryptographic implementations and does
not rely on specific hardware properties is the following. It consists in applying a kind of
secret sharing method, changing the variable representation (say x) into randomized shares
m1, m2, . . . , md+1 called masks such that x = m1 + m2 + · · · + md+1 where + is a group
operation - in practice, the XOR. Since the difficulty of performing an attack of order d (involving
d + 1 shares) increases exponentially with d, it was believed until recently that for increasing
the resistance to attacks, new masks have to be added, thereby increasing the order of the
countermeasure, see [25]. But in these schemes, the profusion of masks implies a heavy load on
the true random number generator, which significantly degrades the performance of the device.
Moreover, the solution in [25] bases itself on a mask refreshing operation for which no secure
implementation has been detailed so far. Now, it is shown in [21] that another option consists
in encoding some of the masks, which is much less costly than adding fresh masks. At the
order 1, this consists in representing x by the ordered pair (F (m), x+m), where F is a well
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2chosen permutation, rather than (m, x+m). The encoding can even be free, in the case it can be
merged in a single table with the downstream function. Notably, it is demonstrated in [22], [23]
that the same effect as adding several masks can be obtained by the encoding of one single mask.
This method, called leakage squeezing, uses permutations F : Fn2 → Fn2 , such that, given some
integer d as large as possible, for every pair of vectors a, b ∈ Fn2 such that the concatenated vector
(a, b) is nonzero and has Hamming weight < d, the value of the Walsh-Hadamard transform of F
at (a, b), is null. We call such functions d-GCI, for Graph Correlation Immune of order d since
the condition is equivalent to saying that the indicator function of the graph {(x, F (x)); x ∈ Fn2}
is correlation immune of order d−1 [5]. Thus a d-GCI function is a protection against an attack
of order d− 1. These functions were introduced in [22] where it is proved that the existence of
such Boolean functions when they are linear is equivalent to the existence of binary linear codes
with parameters [2n, n,≥ d] having two disjoint information sets. Based on this equivalence we
say that a binary linear code of length 2n and dimension n is Complementary Information
Set (CIS for short) with a partition L, R if there is an information set L whose complement
R is also an information set. In general, we will call the partition written in pidgin Maple as
[1..n], [n+1..2n] the systematic partition. More explicitly, we describe CIS codes with relation
to permutations as follows.
Assuming a systematic possibly nonlinear code C of length 2n of the form
C = {(x, F (x))| x ∈ Fn2},
the permutation is constructed as the map x 7→ F (x). In that setting C is CIS by definition if and
only if F is a bijection. When C is a linear code, we can also consider a systematic generator
matrix (I, A) of the code, where I is the identity matrix of order n and A is a square matrix
of order n. Then F (x) = xA, and the CIS condition reduces to the fact that A is nonsingular.
On the other hand, since the complement of an information set of a [2n, n] linear code is an
information set for its dual code, it is clear that systematic self-dual codes are CIS with the
systematic partition. It is also clear that the dual of a CIS code is CIS. Hence CIS codes are a
natural generalization of self-dual codes.
In the present work we give explicit constructions of optimal CIS codes of length < 132, and
derive a Varshamov-Gilbert bound for long CIS codes1. We give general constructions based
on cyclic codes and double circulant codes. We show that all CIS codes of length ≤ 12 can
be classified by the building up construction, an important classification tool for self-dual codes
[16]. We go back to the notion of graph correlation immune function, and based on the notion
of dual distance we give a class of unrestricted codes giving Boolean functions with immunity
of higher degree than the functions in the same number of variables obtained from linear CIS
codes (the practical performance of non linear bijections is explored in the companion paper
[23] ). In particular the best codes we obtain in that way are binary images of certain Z4-codes,
the quadratic residue codes [2]. Notice moreover that the notion of being CIS is not trivial since
there exists at least one optimal code (a [34, 17, 8] code) which is not CIS.
The material is organized as follows. Section 2 collects the necessary notation and definitions.
Section 3 extends the notion of CIS codes to possibly nonlinear codes. Section 4 contains the
general constructions of CIS codes using cyclic codes and double circulant codes. Section 5
1While in cryptographic practice n is not so large, the coding problem is of sufficient intrinsic interest to motivate the study
of long codes.
3describes the known optimal linear CIS codes of length < 132. Section 6 is dedicated to the
building up construction and gives a classification of CIS codes of length ≤ 12. Section 7 derives
a VG bound on long linear CIS codes without relying on previous knowledge on the asymptotic
performance of self-dual codes. All our computations were done using Magma [26].
II. NOTATION AND DEFINITIONS
A. Binary codes
Let C be a binary linear code. Its parameters are formatted as [n, k, d] denoting length,
dimension, and minimum distance. By an unrestricted code we shall mean a possibly nonlinear
code. The dual C⊥ of a linear code C is understood to be with respect to the standard inner
product. The code C is self-dual if C = C⊥ and isodual if C is equivalent to C⊥. A self-dual
code is Type II if the weight of each codeword is a multiple of four and Type I otherwise.
A binary (unrestricted) code C of length n is called systematic if there exists a subset I of
{1, · · · , n} called an information set of C, such that every possible tuple of length |I| occurs
in exactly one codeword within the specified coordinates xi; i ∈ I . We call CIS (unrestricted)
code a systematic code which admits two complementary information sets. The Hamming
weight w(z) of a binary vector z is the number of its nonzero entries. The weight enumerator
WC(x, y) of a code C is the homogeneous polynomial defined by
WC(x, y) =
∑
c∈C
xn−w(c)yw(c).
The code C is formally self-dual or fsd for short, if its weight enumerator is invariant under
the MacWilliams transform, that is,
WC(x, y) = WC(
x+ y√
2
,
x− y√
2
).
It is furthermore called even if
WC(x,−y) = WC(x, y),
and odd otherwise. The generator matrix of a [2n, n] code is said to be in systematic form if
it is blocked as (I, A) with I the identity matrix of order n. If A is circulant then C is said to
be double circulant.
B. Boolean functions
A permutation F of Fn2 is any bijective map from Fn2 → Fn2 . Its Walsh-Hadamard transform
at (a, b) is defined as
F̂ (a, b) =
∑
x∈Fn
2
(−1)a·x+b·F (x),
where a · x denotes the scalar product of vectors a and x.
4C. Dual distance
If C is a binary code, let Bi denote its distance distribution, that is,
Bi =
1
|C| |{(x, y) ∈ C × C | d(x, y) = i}|
The dual distance distribution B⊥i is the MacWilliams transform of the distance distribution, in
the sense that
D⊥C(x, y) =
1
|C|DC(x+ y, x− y),
where
DC(x, y) =
n∑
i=0
Bix
n−iyi,
and
D⊥C (x, y) =
n∑
i=0
B⊥i x
n−iyi.
The dual distance of C is the smallest i > 0 such that B⊥i 6= 0. When C is linear, it is the
minimum distance of C⊥, since D⊥C (x, y) = DC⊥(x, y).
For u ∈ Fn2 , define the character attached to u evaluated in C as
χu(C) =
∑
v∈C
(−1)u·v.
D. Z4-codes
Recall that the Gray map φ from Z4 to F22 is defined by
φ(0) = 00, φ(1) = 01, φ(2) = 11, φ(3) = 10.
This map is extended componentwise from Zn4 to F2n2 . A Z4-code of length n is a Z4-submodule
of Zn4 . The binary image φ(C) of a Z4-code C is just {φ(c)| c ∈ C}. In general a Z4-code C
is of type 4k2l if C ≈ Zk4Zl2 as additive groups. A Z4-code is called free if l = 0. An important
class of Z4-codes is that of QR(p + 1) where QR stands for Quadratic Residue codes and p
is a prime congruent to ±1 modulo 8. They were introduced as extended cyclic codes in [2],
based on Hensel lifting of classical binary quadratic residue codes [20].
III. GENERALIZATION TO NON-LINEAR CODES
Recall that in the context of [22], [23] we need to use Boolean permutations - more precisely,
permutations F : Fn2 → Fn2 , such that, given some integer d as large as possible, for every pair
of vectors a, b ∈ Fn2 such that the concatenated (a, b) is nonzero and has Hamming weight < d,
the value of the Walsh-Hadamard transform of F at (a, b), is null. Such Boolean functions are
called d-GCI, for Graph Correlation Immune.
In [23] the following proposition is proven:
Proposition III.1. The existence of a linear d-GCI function of n variables is equivalent to the
existence of a CIS code of parameters [2n, n,≥ d] with the systematic partition.
5To generalize this result to systematic, possibly nonlinear codes, we attach to such a vectorial
function F the code CF defined by the relationship
CF = {(x, F (x))| x ∈ Fn2}.
Theorem III.2. The permutation F : Fn2 → Fn2 is a d-GCI function of n variables if and only
if the code CF has dual distance ≥ d.
Proof. The proof follows immediately by the characterization of the dual distance of a code C
in terms of characters χu(C) of C regarded as an element in the group algebra Q[F2] [20, Chap.
5, Theorem 7]. Essentially, this characterization says that d⊥ is the smallest non zero weight of
a vector u ∈ Fn2 such that χu(C) 6= 0. Note that the value of the Walsh-Hadamard transform of
F at (a, b) is χu(C) for u = (a, b) and C = CF .
Since the dual of a CIS code is also CIS, Proposition III.1 follows at once from Theorem III.2.
This theorem also allows us to construct better GCI functions by using nonlinear codes. Define
a free Z4-code of length n with 2n codewords to be CIS if it contains two disjoint information
sets.
Theorem III.3. If C is a free systematic Z4-code of length n with 2n codewords, then its binary
image is a systematic code of the form CF for some F. Furthermore, C is CIS with systematic
partition if and only if F is one-to-one.
Proof. By hypothesis the generator matrix of C is of the shape (I, A) and therefore any codeword
of C can be cast as (x,F(x)) for some Z4 linear map F from Zn4 to Zn4 . The result follows by
taking the binary image of each codeword. The CIS property entails that F is bijective, and,
consequently, so is F. Conversely, if F is bijective then [n + 1..2n] is an information set.
Example III.4. Consider the Nordstrom Robinson code in length 16. It is the image of the
octacode [12], which is free and CIS since it is self-dual. It therefore satisfies the hypothesis of
Theorem III.3 and therefore can be attached to a 6-GCI function in 8 variables, when the best
linear CIS code only gives a 5-GCI function as shown in the next section.
Example III.5. Consider QR32 a self-dual extended cyclic Z4-code [3]. Its binary image of
length 64 has distance 14, which is better than the best known [64, 32] binary code of distance
12. Similarly, QR48 has a binary image of distance 18 [3], when the best binary rate one-half
code of length 96 has distance 16.
Example III.6. Recently, Kiermaier and Wassermann [15] have computed the Lee weight
enumerator of the type II Z4-code QR80 and its minimum Lee weight dL = 26. Hence its
binary image has distance 26, which is better than the best known [160, 80] binary code of
distance 24.
IV. GENERAL CONSTRUCTIONS FOR CIS CODES
We now consider general constructions for the class of CIS codes. The following two lemmas
are, respectively, immediate and well-known.
Lemma IV.1. If a [2n, n] code C has generator matrix (I, A) with A invertible then C is CIS
with the systematic partition. Conversely, every CIS code is equivalent to a code with a generator
matrix in that form.
6In particular this lemma applies to systematic self-dual codes whose generator matrix (I, A)
satisfies AAT = I. In the following two results, we identify circulant matrices with the polyno-
mial in x whose x−expansion coincides with the first row of the matrix.
Lemma IV.2. Let f(x) be a polynomial over F2 of degree less than n. Then, gcd(f(x), xn−1) =
1 if and only if the circulant matrix generated by f(x) has F2-rank n.
Proposition IV.3. The double circulant code whose generator matrix is represented by (1, f(x))
satisfying Lemma IV.2 is a CIS code.
Proof. Combine Lemma IV.1 with Lemma IV.2.
In the other direction, a partial converse to Lemma IV.1 is the following.
Proposition IV.4. If a [2n, n] code C has generator matrix (I, A) with rk(A) < n/2 then C is
not CIS .
Proof. Let L = [1..n], and R = [n + 1..2n]. If I is an information set, by the rank hypothesis,
then |I ⋂R| < n/2 and, consequently, |I⋂L| > n/2. So two distinct information sets must
intersect non trivially in L.
The next proposition is an immediate but useful observation.
Proposition IV.5. If C is a [2n, n] code whose dual has minimum weight 1 then C is not CIS.
Proof. If the dual of C has minimum weight 1 then the code C has a zero column and therefore
cannot be CIS.
The previous proposition permits to show it is possible for an optimal code not to be CIS:
Proposition IV.6. There exists at least one optimal binary code that is not CIS.
Proof. The [34, 17, 8] code described in the Magma package BKLC(GF (2), 34, 17)) (best
known linear code of length 34 and dimension 17) is an optimal code (minimum weight 8
is the best possible minimum distance for such a code) whose dual has minimum distance 1,
and therefore is not CIS.
A special class of CIS codes is obtained from combinatorial matrices [6]. Let A be an integral
matrix with 0 /1 valued entries. We shall say that A is the adjacency matrix of a strongly regular
graph (SRG) of parameters (n, κ, λ, µ) if A is symmetric, of order n, verifies AJ = JA = κJ
and satisfies
A2 = κI + λA+ µ(J − I −A),
where I, J are the identity and all-one matrices of order n. Alternatively we shall say that A
is the adjacency matrix of a doubly regular tournament (DRT) of parameters (n, κ, λ, µ) if A
is skew-symmetric, of order n, verifies AJ = JA = κJ and satisfies
A2 = λA + µ(J − I − A).
In the next result we identify A with its reduction mod 2.
Proposition IV.7. Let C be the linear binary code of length 2n spanned by the rows of (I,M).
With the above notation, C is CIS if A is the adjacency matrix of a
• SRG of odd order with κ, λ both even and µ odd and if M = A+ I
• DRT of odd order with κ, µ odd and λ even and if M = A
7• SRG of odd order with κ even and λ, µ both odd and if M = A+ J
• DRT of odd order with κ even and λ, µ both odd and if M = A+ J
Proof. In the first case, reduce the quadratic matrix equation modulo 2 to obtain
A2 = J + I + A.
If x ∈ Fn2 is non trivial in Ker(A+ I), then the above equation written as A(A+ I) = J + I,
entails Jx = x which implies, by studying the eigenspaces of J that x is the all one vector 1.
But because κ is even we know that A1 = 0. This is a contradiction. So, Ker(M) is trivial and
the result follows by Lemma IV.1. The proof in the second case is analogous. In the third case
the matrix equation becomes
A2 = J + I.
If x ∈ Ker(M) then x ∈ Ker(M2), but, by the hypotheses on κ and n, we see that M2 =
A2 + J = I, yielding x = 0. The proof of the fourth case is analogous to that of the third case.
Let q be an odd prime power. Let Q be the q by q matrix with zero diagonal and qij = 1 if
j − i is a square in GF (q) and zero otherwise.
Corollary IV.8. If q = 8j + 5 then the span of (I, Q + I) is CIS. If q = 8j + 3 then the span
of (I, Q) is CIS.
Proof. It is well-known [6] that q = 4k + 1 then Q is the adjacency matrix of a SRG with
parameters (q, q−1
2
, q−5
4
, q−1
4
). If q = 4k + 3 then Q is the adjacency matrix of a DRT with
parameters (q, q−1
2
, q−3
4
, q+1
4
). The result follows by Proposition IV.7.
The codes obtained in that way are Quadratic Double Circulant codes [8]. The third and
fourth cases of Prop IV.7 cannot apply to either Paley SRG or DRT since for these we have
µ− λ = 1.
Example IV.9. Let A be the adjacency matrix of an SRG of parameters (57, 24, 11, 9), which
exists by Brouwer’s database [4]. By the third case of Proposition IV.7 we get a CIS code of
length 114.
Now we look at CIS codes constructed from cyclic codes. Denote by Ci the code C shortened
at coordinate i and by C the extension of C by an overall parity check.
Proposition IV.10. Let C be a cyclic binary code of odd length N, and dimension N+1
2
. If its
generator matrix is in circulant form, both C1 and CN are CIS with the systematic partition. If,
furthermore, the weight of the generator polynomial is odd, then C is CIS with the systematic
partition.
Proof. Recall that in a cyclic code of dimension k, consecutive k indices form an information
set. The result follows then for C1 and CN . In the extended case, the generator matrix of C is
obtained from that of C by inserting a column of 1’s in position N+3
2
. It consists then of two
juxtaposed upper triangular and lower triangular, non singular matrices.
V. CIS CODES WITH RECORD DISTANCES
In this section, we construct optimal or best-known CIS codes of length 2n ≤ 130. We
refer to [14] for the highest known minimum distances of rate one-half codes for lengths up
8to 48. In the rest of the section we list what we know of CIS codes of length < 130. All
statements referring to best rate one-half codes of lengths > 48 come from [28]. All statements
on existence of self-dual codes are from either [9] or [10]. We could have used [11]. The
command BKLC(GF (2), n, k) from the computer package Magma [26] means the best known
binary linear [n, k] code as per [28]. We put a ∗ as an exponent of a distance if the CIS code
is optimal as a rate one-half code. The table captions are as follows
• bk= obtained the command BKLC(GF (2), n, k) from Magma.
• dc=double circulant
• fsd=formally self-dual
• id=isodual
• nsd= not self-dual
• nfsd= not formally self-dual
• qdc=quadratic double circulant
• sc=special construction
• sd= self-dual
• sqr=shortened quadratic residue code
• xqdc=extended quadratic double circulant
• xqr=extended quadratic residue code
.
A. Lengths 2 to 32
2n 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30 32
d 2∗ 2∗ 3∗ 4∗ 4∗ 4∗ 4∗ 5∗ 6∗ 6∗ 7∗ 8∗ 7∗ 8∗ 8∗ 8∗
code dc dc ∼dc sd dc sd sd ∼dc ∼dc nfsd id sd fsd dc dc sd
• 2n = 2, 4. Double circulant codes of length 2n = 2, 4 with first rows 1 or 10, respectively,
are optimal CIS codes with minimum distance 2. They are in fact self-dual.
• 2n = 6. Lemma IV.2 does not imply that double circulant codes of this length with d = 3
are CIS codes. However, the equivalent code {(100 011), (010 101), (001 111)} can be
checked to be an optimal CIS code with d = 3.
• 2n = 8. The extended Hamming [8, 4, 4] code is an optimal CIS code.
• 2n = 10. The double circulant with first row 0111 in [14] is an optimal CIS code with
d = 4 by Lemma IV.2.
• 2n = 12. There exists a self-dual [12, 6, 4] code, which is an optimal CIS code.
• 2n = 14. There exists a self-dual [14, 7, 4] code, which is an optimal CIS code.
• 2n = 16. There is a unique optimal [16, 8, 5] code [14], which is also odd formally self-
dual. This is a double circulant code with first row 00010111. It cannot be a CIS code with
systematic partition by Lemma IV.2. We need a new representation of this code. Take C16
as BKLC(GF (2), 16, 8) in Magma. We check that C16 is also an odd formally self-dual
[16, 8, 5] code. The determinant of the right half submatrix of the standard generator matrix
of C16 is 1. Hence C16 is an optimal CIS code.
• 2n = 18. There is a unique optimal [18, 9, 6] code [14], which is also odd formally self-
dual. It is described as a double circulant code with first row 001001111. The corresponding
polynomial x6 + x3 + x2 + x+ 1 is factored as (x2 + x+ 1)(x4 + x3 + 1). As x9 + 1 has
9a factor x3 + 1 = (x + 1)(x2 + x + 1), this code cannot be proved to be CIS by Lemma
IV.2. On the other hand, we take C18 as BKLC(GF (2), 18, 9) in Magma, which is also a
[18, 9, 6] code. The determinant of the right half submatrix of the standard generator matrix
of C18 is 1. Hence C18 is an optimal CIS code.
• 2n = 20. There are 1682 optimal [20, 10, 6] codes [14]. There are exactly eight formally
self-dual codes among them [14]. We obtain the first non-formally self-dual optimal CIS
code by taking BKLC(GF (2), 20, 10) in Magma notation with the systematic partition.
• 2n = 22. We take BKLC(GF (2), 20, 10) in Magma notation with the systematic partition.
This code is isodual and fsd.
• 2n = 24. The extended Golay code is CIS as a self-dual code. It is also optimal as a rate
one-half code.
• 2n = 26. The fsd isodual code C26,1 in the notation of [14] is CIS with the systematic
partition.
• 2n = 28. The even fsd BKLC(GF (2), 20, 10) is not self-dual but still CIS with the
sytematic partition by Lemma IV.1.
• 2n = 30. We use a double circulant code with generator matrix (1, f) where f = x10 +
x8+ x7 + x5 + x3+ x+1, an irreducible polynomial. This code is CIS with the systematic
partition by Proposition IV.3.
• 2n = 32. There are five extremal Type II [32, 16, 8] self-dual codes. They are also optimal
as rate one-half codes.
B. Lengths 34 to 64
2n 34 36 38 40 42 44 46 48 50 52 54 56 58 60 62 64
d 8∗ 8∗ 8 9 10∗ 10∗ 11∗ 12∗ 10 10 12 12 12 12 12 12
code sc sd sd nsd fsd fsd fsd sd sd sd bk sd qdc sd sd sd
• 2n = 34. We have checked that BKLC(GF (2), 34, 17) of distance 8 is not CIS with
systematic partition. There are s-extremal self-dual [34, 17, 6] codes (see [1]). Taking the
doubly-even subcode of such a code and adding an element of the shadow we obtain a
[34, 17, 8] code with generator matrix (I, A) with A given by


1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1
1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1
1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1
0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1
1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1
1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1
0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1
0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0
0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1
0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0


.
Then it can be checked that this code is CIS with partition L = {14, . . . , 30} and R =
{1, . . . , 13, 31, . . . , 34}.
• 2n = 36. There are many self-dual Type I [36, 18, 8] self-dual codes. They are also optimal
as rate one-half codes.
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• 2n = 38. There are many self-dual Type I [38, 19, 8] self-dual codes. They are the best
known rate one-half codes of that length.
• 2n = 40. There is an odd fsd isodual BKLC(GF (2), 40, 20) of distance 9, the best known
rate one-half code of that length. It is CIS by computer check of Lemma IV.1.
• 2n = 42. There is an even fsd isodual BKLC(GF (2), 42, 21) of distance 10, an optimal
rate one-half code of that length. It is CIS by computer check of Lemma IV.1.
• 2n = 44. There is an odd fsd isodual BKLC(GF (2), 44, 22) of distance 10, an optimal
rate one-half code of that length. It is CIS by computer check of Lemma IV.1.
• 2n = 46. There is an odd fsd isodual BKLC(GF (2), 46, 23) of distance 11, an optimal
rate one-half code of that length. It is CIS by computer check of Lemma IV.1.
• 2n = 48. There is a unique Type II [48, 24, 12] code, an optimal rate one-half code of that
length.
• 2n = 50. There are at least 6 Type I self-dual codes of distance 10, which is best known
as per [28].
• 2n = 52. There are at least 499 Type I self-dual codes of distance 10, which is best known
as per [28].
• 2n = 54. The code BKLC(GF (2), 54, 27) has distance 11. Computing a determinant
shows that it is CIS with the systematic partition.
• 2n = 56. There are Type II self-dual codes of distance 12, which is the best known distance
for rate one-half codes of that length.
• 2n = 58. The Quadratic Double Circulant attached to the prime 29 has distance 12 and is
CIS with the systematic partition by determinant computation.
• 2n = 60. There are at least 15 Type I self-dual codes of distance 12, the best known
distance for rate one-half codes of that length.
• 2n = 62. There are at least 20 Type I self-dual codes of distance 12, the best known
distance for rate one-half codes of that length.
• 2n = 64. There are at least 3270 Type II self-dual codes of distance 12, the best known
distance for rate one-half codes of that length.
C. Lengths 66 to 100
2n 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80 82 84 86 88 90 92 94 96 98 100
d 12 13 15 15 14 14 15 16 14 15 16 17 18 16 16 16 17 18
code sd bk bk bk xqr sd bk sd sd bk sd sqr bk sd sd sd bk sc
• 2n = 66. There are at least 3 Type I self-dual codes of distance 12, the best known distance
for rate one-half codes of that length.
• 2n = 68. The code BKLC(GF (2), 68, 34) of distance 13 is CIS with the systematic
partition, by determinant computation.
• 2n = 70. The code BKLC(GF (2), 70, 35) of distance 15 is CIS with the systematic
partition, by determinant computation.
• 2n = 72. The code BKLC(GF (2), 72, 36) of distance 15 is CIS with the systematic
partition, by determinant computation.
• 2n = 74. Is BKLC(GF (2), 74, 37) of distance 14 CIS? The extended quadratic residue
code [74, 37, 14] is CIS with the systematic partition by Proposition IV.10.
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• 2n = 76. There are at least 2 Type I self-dual codes of distance 14, the best known distance
for rate one-half codes of that length.
• 2n = 78. A shortened code of quadratic residue code [79, 40, 15] leads to a [78, 39, 14] CIS
code with the systematic partition, by Proposition IV.10.
• 2n = 80. There are at least 15 Type II self-dual codes of distance 16, the best known
distance for rate one-half codes of that length.
• 2n = 82. There is at least 1 Type I self-dual code of distance 14, the best known distance
for rate one-half codes of that length.
• 2n = 84. The code BKLC(GF (2), 84, 42) of distance 15 is CIS with the systematic
partition, by determinant computation.
• 2n = 86. There is at least 1 Type I self-dual code of distance 16, the best known distance
for rate one-half codes of that length.
• 2n = 88. A shortened code of the quadratic residue code [89, 45, 17] leads to a [88, 44, 17]
CIS code with the systematic partition, by Proposition IV.10.
• 2n = 90. The code BKLC(GF (2), 88, 44) of distance 18 is CIS with the systematic
partition, by determinant computation.
• 2n = 92. There are at least 1 Type I self-dual code of distance 16, the best known distance
for rate one-half codes of that length.
• 2n = 94. There is at least 1 Type I self-dual code of distance 16, the best known distance
for rate one-half codes of that length [13].
• 2n = 96. There is at least 1 Type I self-dual code of distance 16, the best known distance
for rate one-half codes of that length.
• 2n = 98. The code BKLC(GF (2), 98, 49) of distance 17 is CIS with the systematic
partition, by determinant computation.
• 2n = 100. The code BKLC(GF (2), 100, 50) of distance 18 is CIS with the systematic
partition, since it is obtained by puncturing and double shortening from a Quadratic Residue
code of length 103 [28]. The argument is similar to Proposition IV.10.
D. Lengths 102 to 130
2n 102 104 106 108 110 112 114 116 118 120 122 124 126 128 130
d 19 20 19 20 18 19 20 20 20 20 20 21 21 22 22
code bk bk qdc bk bk bk bk sc sc sd qdc xqdc bk bk sc
• 2n = 102. The code BKLC(GF (2), 102, 51) of distance 19 is CIS with the systematic
partition, by determinant computation.
• 2n = 104. The code BKLC(GF (2), 104, 52) of distance 20 is CIS with the systematic
partition, by determinant computation.
• 2n = 106. The code BKLC(GF (2), 106, 53) of distance 19 is CIS by computer search.
• 2n = 108. The code BKLC(GF (2), 108, 54) of distance 20 is CIS with the systematic
partition, by determinant computation.
• 2n = 110. The code BKLC(GF (2), 110, 55) of distance 18 is CIS with the systematic
partition, by determinant computation.
• 2n = 112. The code BKLC(GF (2), 112, 56) of distance 19 is CIS with the systematic
partition, by determinant computation.
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• 2n = 114. The code BKLC(GF (2), 114, 57) of distance 20 is CIS with the systematic
partition, by determinant computation.
• 2n = 116. The code BKLC(GF (2), 116, 58) is not CIS by Prop IV.5, since its dual has
minimum weight 1. A CIS code can be obtained in the following way: consider g(x) the
generator polynomial of the [127, 71, 19] BCH code of length 127 with designed distance
19. Consider a generator matrix G0 of the code obtained by shifting the coefficients of
g(x) in the usual way. Consider now the matrices G1 and G2 obtained by shifting G0 of
respectively 1 and 2 positions. We now construct the matrix G′ = G0 +G1 +G2. We then
add to G′ a last column of 1′s and we erase the first row to obtain a matrix G. The matrix
G generates a [128, 70, 20] code C. Now if one shortens C on the first twelve columns,
one obtains a [116, 58, 20] code which is CIS with the systematic partition.
• 2n = 118. The code BKLC(GF (2), 118, 59) is not CIS by Prop IV.5, since its dual
has minimum weight 1. Similarly to the case 2n = 116, a CIS code can be obtained in
the following way: consider g(x) the generator polynomial of the BCH code of length
127 and designed distance 19. Consider a generator matrix G0 of the code obtained by
shifting the coefficients of g(x) in the usual way. Consider now the matrices G1 and G2
obtained by shifting G0 of respectively 1 and 2 positions. We now construct the matrix
G′ = G0 + G1 + G2. We then add to G′ a last column of 1 and we erase the first two
rows to obtain a matrix G. The matrix G generates a [128, 69, 20] code C. Now if one
shortens the first ten columns of C, one obtains a [118, 59, 20] code which is CIS with the
systematic partition.
• 2n = 120. There is at least 1 Type II self-dual code of distance 20, the best known distance
for rate one-half codes of that length.
• 2n = 122. Is BKLC(GF (2), 122, 61) of distance 20 CIS? The code QDC(61) of distance
20 is CIS with the systematic partition, by determinant computation.
• 2n = 124. Is BKLC(GF (2), 124, 62) of distance 20 CIS? The code
ExtendCode(BorderedDoublyCirculantQRCode(61))
of distance 20 is CIS with the systematic partition, by determinant computation.
• 2n = 126. The code BKLC(GF (2), 126, 63) of distance 21 is CIS with the systematic
partition, by determinant computation.
• 2n = 128. The code BKLC(GF (2), 128, 64) of distance 22 is CIS with the systematic
partition, by determinant computation.
• 2n = 130. The code BKLC(GF (2), 130, 65) of distance 22 is CIS by computer search.
VI. CLASSIFICATION
A. Number of equivalence classes of CIS codes
Let n ≥ 2 be an integer and gn denote the cardinality of GL(n, 2) the general linear group
of dimension n over GF (2). It is well-known (see [20, p.399]), that
gn =
n−1∏
j=0
(2n − 2j).
Proposition VI.1. The number en of equivalence classes of CIS codes of dimension n ≥ 2 is
at most gn/n!.
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Proof. By Lemma IV.1 every CIS code of dimension n is equivalent to the linear span of (I, A)
for some A ∈ GL(n, 2). But the columns of such an A are pairwise linearly independent, hence
pairwise distinct. Permuting the columns of A leads to equivalent codes.
Example VI.2. There is a unique CIS code in length 2 namely R2 the repetition code of length 2.
For n = 2, the g2 = 6 invertible matrices reduce to three under column permutation: the identity
matrix I and the two triangular matrices T1 =
(
1 1
1 0
)
, and T2 =
(
0 1
1 1
)
. The generator
matrix (I, I) spans the direct sum R2⊕R2, while the two codes spanned by (I, T1) and (I, T2)
are equivalent to a code C3, an isodual code which is not self-dual. Thus e2 = 2 < g2/2! = 3.
The numbers gn/n! grow very fast: 3, 28, 840, 83328. They count the number of bases of
Fn2 over F2 [27, A053601]. The numbers en do not grow so fast as can be seen by looking at
Table I.
B. Building up construction
The building up construction [16] is known for binary self-dual codes. In this section, we
extend it to CIS codes. We show that every CIS code can be constructed in this way.
Lemma VI.3. Given a [2n, n] CIS code C with generator matrix (In|A) where A is an invertible
square matrix of order n, we can obtain a [2(n− 1), n− 1] CIS code C ′ with generator matrix
(In−1|A′), where A′ is an invertible square matrix of order n− 1.
Proof. Let ai be the ith column of A and ri be the ith row of A for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. We delete the
first column a1. Then for each i, let r′i be the ith row obtained from ri after the removal of the
first coordinate of ri. Since there are n rows r′i in the (n−1)-dimensional space, there is j such
that r′j =
∑
i 6=j cir
′
i, where ci is uniquely determined. Then delete the jth row of (In|A) and the
jth column of (In|A) to get a [2(n − 1), n − 1] CIS code C ′ with generator matrix (In−1|A′),
where A′ is invertible. We remark that A′ is a square matrix of order n− 1 whose rows consist
of the n− 1 r′is except for r′j and whose columns consist of a′is (2 ≤ i ≤ n), each of which is
the ith column obtained from ai after the removal of the jth component of ai.
Proposition VI.4 (Building up construction). Suppose that C is a [2n, n] CIS code C with
generator matrix (In|A), where A is invertible with n rows r1, . . . , rn. Then for any two vectors
x = (x1, · · · , xn) and y = (y1, · · · , yn)T the following matrix G1 generates a [2(n + 1), n+ 1]
CIS code C1 with the systematic partition:
G1 =


1 0 0 · · · 0 z1 x
0 1 0 · · · 0 y1 r1
0 0 1 · · · 0 y2 r2
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 0 0 · · · 1 yn rn

 , (1)
where there are multipliers ci’s satisfying x =
∑n
i=1 ciri and z1 = 1 +
∑n
i=1 ciyi.
Proof. It suffices to show that the rows of the right half of G1 are linearly independent. Suppose
α(z1|x) + β1(y1|r1) + · · ·+ βn(yn|rn) = 0. Then αx+
∑n
i=1 βiri = 0. If α = 0, then β = 0 for
all i as it should. If α = 1, then x +
∑n
i=1 βiri = 0. Since x =
∑n
i=1 ciri for unique ci’s, we
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have βi = ci for all i. Thus 0 = z1+
∑n
i=1 ciyi = 1+
∑n
i=1 ciyi+
∑n
i=1 ciyi = 1, a contradiction.
Thus the rows of the right half of G′ are linearly independent
Example VI.5. Let us consider a [6, 3, 3] CIS code C whose generator matrix is given below.
G =

 1 0 0 0 1 10 1 0 1 0 1
0 0 1 1 1 1

 .
In order to apply Proposition VI.4, we take for example x = (1, 1, 0) and y = (1, 1, 0)T . Then
c1 = c2 = 1, c3 = 0. Hence z = 1. In fact, we get the extended Hamming [8, 4, 4] code whose
generator matrix is given below.
G1 =


1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0
0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1
0 0 1 0 1 1 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1

 .
Furthermore, starting from G1, we can obtain G back by following the proof of Lemma VI.3.
Proposition VI.6. Any [2n, n] CIS code C is equivalent to a [2n, n] CIS code with the systematic
partition which is constructed from a [2(n− 1), n− 1] CIS code by using Proposition VI.4.
Proof. Up to permutation equivalence, we may assume that C is a [2n, n] CIS code with
systematic generator matrix G2 = (In|A), where A is invertible. For each i (1 ≤ i ≤ n),
we let ai be the ith column of A and ri be the ith row of A. It suffices to show that there exists
a 2(n − 1) × (n − 1) systematic generator matrix (In−1|A′) with A′ being invertible, whose
extension by Proposition VI.4 produces the matrix (In|A) back. We know from Lemma VI.3
that there exists a [2(n − 1), n − 1] CIS code C ′ with systematic generator matrix (In−1|A′),
where A′ is invertible. By the remark at the end of the proof of Lemma VI.3, A′ is a square
matrix of order n − 1 whose rows consist of the n − 1 r′i s except for r′j and whose columns
consist of a′i s (2 ≤ i ≤ n), each of which is the ith column obtained from ai after the removal
of the jth component of ai. We denote the first column a1 of A by a1 = (a11, a21, . . . , a
j
1, . . . , a
n
1)
T
and a′1 by the column from a1 after the removal of the jth component of a1. We choose y = a′1
and x = r′j . Then it follows from Proposition VI.4 that the below generator matrix generates a
[2n, n] CIS code.
G3 =


1 0 0 · · · 0 z1 r′j
0 1 0 · · · 0 a11 r′1
0 0 1 · · · 0 a21 r′2
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 0 0 · · · 1 an1 r′n

 ,
where z1 = 1+
∑
i 6=j cia
i
1 and r′j =
∑
i 6=j cir
′
i for some ci’s. We claim that this z1 is equal to the
missing component aj1 of a′1. Suppose not. Then a
j
1 =
∑
i 6=j cia
i
1, that is, a
j
1+
∑
i 6=j cia
i
1 = 0. Then
(aj1|r′j) +
∑
i 6=j ci(a
i
1|r′i) = (0|0). This is a contradiction since the set {r1 = (a11|r′1), . . . , rj =
(aj1|r′j), . . . , rn = (an1 |r′n)} is linearly independent. Thus z1 = aj1. Therefore, the matrix G3 is
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equivalent to the original matrix G2 after permuting rows and columns of G3. This completes
the proof.
Corollary VI.7. Let C be a double circulant CIS [2n, n] code whose generator matrix is of the
form G = (I|A), where A is an invertible circulant matrix whose first row r1 has odd weight.
Then the matrix G1 below generates a CIS code with systematic partition.
G1 =


1 0 . . . 0 ǫ 1 . . . 1
0 1
.
.
. I
.
.
. A
0 1

 ,
where ǫ = 0 if n is odd and ǫ = 1 otherwise.
Proof. This is the extension of (I|A) using Proposition VI.4 where x and y are all one vectors,
x is the sum of all rows of A, and z = ǫ.
Remark VI.8. Proposition VI.6 implies that one can construct all [2n + 2, n + 1] CIS codes
with systematic partition from the set of all [2n, n] CIS codes with systematic partition, many of
which may be equivalent via column permutations. Here is a natural question. Given a complete
list of inequivalent [2n, n] CIS codes with systematic partition, do we always construct all
[2n + 2, n+ 1] CIS codes with systematic partition using Proposition VI.4? This may be so in
most cases but it may not be true for some cases. Below is a reason.
Let Ci (i = 1, 2) be a [2n, n] CIS code with generator matrix (I|Ai), where Ai is invertible.
Suppose C1 is equivalent to C2 under some 2n-column permutation (possibly interchanging
some columns of the left half coordinates of C1 with some columns in the right half). Let Di
(i = 1, 2) be the set of all CIS codes built from (I|Ai) by Proposition VI.4. Then it may not be
true that D1 is equivalent to D2, that is, for any C3 ∈ D1, there exists C4 ∈ D2 such that C3
is equivalent to C4 under some 2n+2-column permutation, and vice versa. This is because the
equivalence of C1 and C2 is via a permutation on 2n columns but Proposition VI.4 is concerned
about the right half of the (n + 1) × (2n + 2) matrix in the Equation (1). Therefore, given a
complete list of inequivalent CIS codes of length 2n all of which have systematic partitions, the
set of the CIS codes of length 2n + 2 constructed from Proposition VI.4 does not necessarily
give a complete list of inequivalent CIS codes of length 2n + 2 all of which have systematic
partitions. In fact, F. Freibert has informed us that a certain set of the 27 inequivalent [8, 4] CIS
codes with systematic partition produce only 194 [10, 5] CIS codes with systematic partition
by Proposition VI.4, although there are exactly 195 inequivalent CIS codes of length 10 (See
Proposition VI.12).
In what follows, we give a counting formula similar to a mass formula. This is useful in
determining whether a list of inequivalent CIS codes is complete. Recall from Sec. VI-A that
gn denotes the cardinality of GL(n, 2).
Proposition VI.9. Let n ≥ 2. Let C be the set of all [2n, n] CIS codes and let S2n act on C as
column permutations of the codes in C. Let C1, . . . , Cs be representatives from every equivalence
class of C under the action of S2n. Let Csys be the set of all [2n, n] CIS codes with generator
matrix (In|A) with A invertible. Suppose that each Ci ∈ Csys (1 ≤ i ≤ s). Then we have
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gn =
s∑
j=1
|OrbS2n(Cj) ∩Csys|, (2)
where OrbS2n(Cj) denotes the orbit of Cj under S2n.
Proof. Let A ∈ GL(n, 2). Then each A gives a unique [2n, n] CIS code with generator matrix
(I|A). Therefore gn = |Csys|. We also note that OrbS2n(Ci) ∩Csys and OrbS2n(Cj) ∩Csys are
disjoint whenever i 6= j. Therefore it is enough to show that each CIS code CA with generator
matrix (I|A) belongs to OrbS2n(Cj) ∩ Csys for a unique j. Since {C1, . . . , Cs} is a set of
representatives of all CIS codes, CA belongs to a unique orbit OrbS2n(Cj) for some j. Clearly
CA is in Csys by definition. Therefore CA belongs to a unique OrbS2n(Cj)∩Csys as desired.
C. Classification of short CIS codes
We classify all CIS codes of lengths up to 12 up to equivalence. We successively apply
Proposition VI.4 from the repetition code of length 2 to obtain lists of inequivalent CIS codes
of lengths 4, 6, 8, 10, and 12. For lengths up to 10, we have checked directly that these lists
satisfy Equation (2). For length 12, checking directly that our list satisfies Equation (2) takes
too long. So by inventing equivalence classes among matrices of GF (n, 2), F. Freibert [7] has
confirmed that our list of inequivalent CIS codes of length 12 is complete.
It is easy to see that any CIS code has minimum distance ≥ 2.
• 2n = 2. It is clear that there is a unique CIS code of length 2, the repetition code.
• 2n = 4. Applying Proposition VI.4 to the repetition code of length 2, we show that there
are exactly two CIS codes of length 4. Their generator matrices are (I|A2,1) and (I|A2,2),
where
A2,1 =
(
1 0
0 1
)
, A2,2 = T2 =
(
0 1
1 1
)
• 2n = 6. Using A2,1, we have exactly six CIS codes of length 6, one of which is an optimal
code of minimum distance 3. Similarly using A2,2, we have exactly five CIS codes of length
6. But these latter codes are equivalent to some of the former codes. Generator matrices of
the form (I|A3,i) (1 ≤ i ≤ 6) are given below. Only A3,i are shown in order.

 1 0 00 1 0
0 0 1

 ,

 1 0 01 1 0
0 0 1

 ,

 1 0 01 1 0
1 0 1

 ,

 0 1 01 1 0
1 0 1

 ,

 1 1 10 1 0
0 0 1

 ,

 1 1 11 1 0
1 0 1


Hence we have the following.
Proposition VI.10. There are exactly six CIS codes of length 6. Only one code has d = 3
and the rest have d = 2.
• 2n = 8. From each of (I|A3,i) (1 ≤ i ≤ 6) we have many CIS codes of length 8 and thus
consider the equivalence among them. We have the following.
Proposition VI.11. There are exactly 27 CIS codes of length 8. Only one code has d = 4,
three have d = 3, and the rest have d = 2.
• 2n = 10. In a similar manner, we show the following.
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Proposition VI.12. There are exactly 195 CIS codes of length 10. Four codes have d = 4,
thirty five codes have d = 3, and the rest have d = 2.
• 2n = 12. Furthermore, using the 195 CIS codes of length 10, we have classified CIS codes
of length 12.
Proposition VI.13. There are exactly 2705 CIS codes of length 12. More precisely, exactly
41 codes have d = 41, 565 codes have d = 3, and the rest have d = 2.
We summarize our classification in Table I. The ith column of the table (i = 2, 3, 4) represents
the number of CIS codes with d = i and the parenthesis gives the number of CIS codes in the
order of sd, non-sd fsd, and non-fsd. The last column denotes the total number of CIS codes
of the corresponding length. The actual generator matrices of lengths 8, 10, 12 will be posted
in [17].
TABLE I
CLASSIFICATION OF ALL CIS CODES OF LENGTHS UP TO 12 IN THE ORDER OF SD, NON-SD FSD, AND NON-FSD
2n d = 2 d = 3 d = 4 Total #
2 1 (1+0+0) 1
4 2 (1+1+0) 2
6 5 (1+2+2) 1 (0+1+0) 6
8 22 (1+9+12) 4 (0+2+2) 1 (1+0+0) 27
10 156 (2+40+114) 35 (0+9+26) 4 (0+2+2) 195
12 2099 (2+318+1779) 565 (0+87+478) 41 (1+7+33) 2705
VII. LONG CIS CODES
In this section we show that there are long CIS codes satisfying the VG bound for rate
one-half codes,that is with relative distance ≥ H−1(1/2) ≈ 0.11 . We do not use the fact that
self-dual codes are CIS. There are polynomial-time constructible binary self-dual codes with
relative distance ≈ 0.02 [24, p.34, Remark 1]. We begin by a well-known fact [20, p.399].
Lemma VII.1. The number of invertible n by n matrices is ∼ c2n2, with c ≈ 0.29.
Denote by B(n, d) the number of invertible matrices A such that d columns or less of (I, A)
are linearly dependent. A crude upper bound on this function can be derived as follows.
Lemma VII.2. The quantity B(n, d) is ≤M(n, d) where
M(n, d) =
d∑
j=2
j−1∑
t=1
(
n
j − t
)(
n
t
)
t2n(n−1).
Proof. Let j be the size of the linearly dependent family of column vectors of (I, A), with
j− t columns of I and t columns of A. Choose one column amongst t to be obtained as linear
combination of j − 1 others. Neglecting the invertibility of A we have n− 1 columns of A to
choose freely.
Denote by H(x) = −x log2 x− (1− x) log2(1− x) the binary entropy function [20, p.308].
Lemma VII.3. The quantity M(n, d) is dominated by 2n2−n22nH(δ) when d ∼ 2δn with 0 <
δ < 1.
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Proof. We evaluate the inner sum in M(n, d) by the Chu-Vandermonde identity(
2n
j
)
=
j∑
t=0
(
n
t
)(
n
j − t
)
.
Then, the outer sum
d∑
j=0
(
2n
j
)
is evaluated by standard entropic estimates for binomials [20, p.310]. Note that t ≤ n, a sub-
exponential quantity.
Proposition VII.4. For each δ such that H(δ) < 0.5 there are long CIS codes of relative
distance δ.
Proof. Consider (I, A) as the parity check matrix of the CIS code and combine Lemmas
VII.1,VII.3,VII.2 to ensure that, asymptotically, |GL(n, 2)| >> B(n, d) showing the existence
of a CIS code of distance > d, for n large enough.
VIII. CONCLUSION AND OPEN PROBLEMS
In this article, we have introduced a new class of rate one-half binary codes: CIS codes.
In length 2n these codes are, when in systematic form, in one-to-one correspondence with
linear bijective permutations in n variables. More generally, bijective permutations correspond
to a certain class of systematic codes. The graph correlation immunity of such permutations is
exactly the dual distance of the attached code. Free Z4 codes of rate one-half can produce such
codes by taking binary images. It would be a worthwhile task to create a database of Z4 codes
in website form on the model of [28]. There should be some good rate one-half free Z4-codes
in the lengths 40 to 80.
We have studied the minimum distances of linear CIS codes up to length 130 and we have
found that it is possible to construct CIS codes as good as the best known minimum distance of
rate one-half codes, and equal to the best possible distance of these codes up to length 36. Using
Table I, we see that the first length when there is an optimal CIS code that is not self-dual is 4,
and that the first length when an optimal CIS code cannot be self-dual is 6. The first length when
an optimal CIS code is not a formally self-dual code is 20. Thus this new class of codes is richer
than both self-dual, and formally self-dual codes. While invariant theory is not available to study
these codes, a mass formula analogue is Prop. VI.9. We proved that up to length 130, there exist
CIS codes with the best known parameters and we also proved that some optimal codes may
not be CIS (for instance in length 34), it hence asks the question whether it is possible to find
parameters for which CIS codes have a minimum distance strictly lower than the best linear
codes? More generally, does the CIS property entails an upper bound on the minimum distance?
Finally, it is worth extending the definition of CIS codes to other fields than F2, and also to
rings. One motivation might be the growing field of Generalized Boolean functions, that is with
ranges other than F2. Another motivation like in §3 might be to obtain binary CIS codes by
some alphabet changing construction.
19
Acknowledgement. The authors wish to thank S. Guilley and H. Maghrebi for useful discus-
sions on the leakage squeezing method. The authors also thank Finley Freibert for the discussion
on the computational issues of CIS codes. They thank the anonymous referees for helpful remarks
that greatly improved the presentation of the material. J.-L. Kim was partially supported by the
Project Completion Grant (year 2011-2012) at the University of Louisville.
REFERENCES
[1] C. Bachoc, P. Gaborit, Designs and self-dual codes with long shadows, J. Comb. Theory, Ser. A 105(1)(2004) 15–34.
[2] A. Bonnecaze, P. Sole´, R.A. Calderbank, Quaternary quadratic residue codes and unimodular lattices, IEEE Transactions
on Information Theory,(1995) 366–377.
[3] A. Bonnecaze, P. Sole´, C. Bachoc, and B. Mourrain, Type II codes over Z4, IEEE Transactions on Information
Theory,(1997) 969–976.
[4] A.E. Brouwer, Table of strongly regular graphs
http://www.win.tue.nl/∼aeb/graphs/srg/srgtab.html.
[5] C. Carlet,Boolean functions for cryptography and error-correcting codes, in Boolean Models and Methods in Mathematics,
Computer Science, and Engineering, ser. Encyclopedia of Mathematics and its Applications, Y. Crama and P. L. Hammer,
Eds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, vol. 134, ch. 8, pp. 257397.
[6] S.T. Dougherty J.-L. Kim, and P. Sole´, Double circulant codes from two class association schemes, Advances in
Mathematics of Communications, 1 (2007), 45–64.
[7] F. Freibert, Self-dual codes, subcode structures, and applications, Ph.D. thesis, University of Louisville, 2012.
[8] P. Gaborit, Quadratic double circulant codes over fields. J. Combin. Theory Ser. A 97 , no. 1,(2002), 85–107.
[9] P. Gaborit, Table of binary sd codes of Type I
http://www.unilim.fr/pages_perso/philippe.gaborit/SD/GF2/GF2I.htm.
[10] P. Gaborit, Table of binary sd codes of Type II
http://www.unilim.fr/pages_perso/philippe.gaborit/SD/GF2/GF2II.htm.
[11] M. Harada, A. Munemasa, database of self-dual codes
http://www.math.is.tohoku.ac.jp/∼munemasa/research/codes/sd2.htm .
[12] R. Hammons, V. Kumar, A.R. Calderbank, N.J.A. Sloane, P. Sole´, Kerdock, Preparata, Goethals and others are linear over
Z4. IEEE Trans. of Information Theory,(1994) 301–319.
[13] M. Harada, M. Kiermaier, A. Wassermann, R. Yorgova, New binary singly even self-dual codes, IEEE Trans. Inform.
Theory (2010) 1612–1617.
[14] T.A. Gulliver and P.R.J. Ostergard, Binary optimal linear rate 1/2 codes, Discrete Math, 283 (2004) 255–261.
[15] M. Kiermaier and A. Wassermann, Minimum weights and weight enumerators of Z4-linear quadratic residue codes,
preprint, June, 2011.
[16] J.-L. Kim, New extremal self-dual codes of lengths 36, 38, and 58, IEEE Trans. on Inform. Theory (2001), 386–393.
[17] J.-L. Kim, preprints http://www.math.louisville.edu/∼jlkim/preprints.html.
[18] P. C. Kocher: Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems. CRYPTO 1996,
(1996),104–113.
[19] P. C. Kocher, J. Jaffe, B. Jun. Differential Power Analysis. CRYPTO 1999, (1999) 388–397.
[20] F.J. MacWilliams, N.J.A. Sloane, The Theory of Error Correcting Codes, North Holland (1981).
[21] H. Maghrebi, S. Guilley and J.-L. Danger. Leakage Squeezing Countermeasure Against High-Order Attacks.Proceedings
of WISTP, Springer LNCS 6633, (2011) 208–223,
[22] H. Maghrebi, S. Guilley, C. Carlet and J.-L. Danger. Classification of High-Order Boolean Masking Schemes and
Improvements of their Efficiency. http://eprint.iacr.org/2011/520.
[23] H. Maghrebi, S. Guilley, C. Carlet and J.-L. Danger. Optimal First-Order Masking with Linear and Non-Linear Bijections,
proceedings of Africacrypt 2012.
[24] H.-G. Quebbemann, On even codes. Discrete Math. 98 (1991), no. 1, 29–34.
[25] M. Rivain and E. Prouff. Provably Secure Higher-Order Masking of AES, Proceedings of CHES 2010, Springer LNCS
6225 (2010) 413–427.
[26] Magma language webpage http://magma.maths.usyd.edu.au/magma/
[27] N.J.A. Sloane, The Online Encyclopedia of Integer Sequences (OEIS), http://oeis.org/.
[28] M. Grassl, Table of linear codes,www.codetables.de.
